Political Strength Key to Iraqi Stability

There’s a catch-22 in the Iraqi cabinet. While six Shiite cabinet members have resigned in an attempt to put political pressure on Prime Minister Maliki, their actions will destabilize the Iraqi political body. Doing so will only emphasize the instability of Iraq and encourage pro-Iraq War policymakers in the U.S. to remain in the country.

If Moqtada al-Sadr and his Shiite followers want the U.S. to leave their country, they must work within the political body of the Iraqi government to support the delicate country.

The fact that the six cabinet members are following a radical Shiite cleric puts an important emphasis on religious factions. These religious affiliations also have political implications in the nation. The link between religious affiliations and political parties is critical in Middle East politics- Iraq is no different.

The sectarian violence that pushes Iraq on the brink of civil war is a result of political oppression against Shiite and Kurdish factions under the Saddam regime. If Iraq is to develop, it cannot plunge itself back into a single-party government system. Shiite cabinet members should remain in the cabinet a work with PM Maliki to create meaningful coalitions amongst Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.

The desire to see U.S. troops, of course, is important to keeping Iraq an independent state. A March 2007 poll suggests 4 in 5 Iraqis oppose U.S. presence in their country. However, the domestic heat on President Bush to withdrawal troops is very apparent and should serve as a reminder to Iraq that a majority of the Americando not wish to overstay their welcome in Iraq.

First, the Democrats took Congress in the midterm elections. Then, Donald Rumsfeld, architect of the current Iraq war policy, resigned from his post as Secretary of Defense. Most recently, Congress, empowered by its election mandate, has threatened to withhold defense funding if withdrawal timetables are not established by the Bush administration. This defiance of the Bush administration as well as Bush’s position as a “lame duck” president culminates to suggest a turn in U.S. policy towards Iraq in the near future.

It is ultimately up to the Iraqi government, however, to determine U.S. withdrawal. Even anti-Iraq War proponents should understand that Iraqi instability will not recover on its own. Iraqis themselves understand this. In the same March 2007 poll, only 1 in 3 Iraqis wanted the U.S. to withdrawal immediately.

If U.S. is to make this war worth the thousands of sacrificed men and women, we must encourage the Iraq government to establish itself for the long run. This includes allowing the Iraqi government to establishe itself in the international community independently from U.S. influence. Iraq’s decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with neighboring Syria in November of 2006, for example, illustrates the Iraq political resolve to stabilize the new nation and legitimize the vulnerable administration. The U.S. may not interact with Syria, but must and has to some degree accepted that Iraq must do so.

More efforts like this should be attempted by the Iraq government regardless of the U.S.’s position on the matter. Iraqis must think for themselves cohesively and decisively. Doing so will legitimize the body in the eyes of the international community and facilitate the withdrawal of American forces.

This recent Shiite withdrawal from political participation only works counter to strengthening Iraq politics and delays U.S. withdrawal--the very thing al-Sadr and his followers are hoping to achieve.